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Abstract
The article asks whether English professional football clubs have the potential to exploit non-English-speaking players 
during contract negotiations and signing meetings. We draw on evidence we gathered from a series of semi-structured 
interviews with football agents, former migrant players, and player liaison/welfare officers who currently work or have 
previously worked in English professional leagues. We also draw on normative insights from legal, moral, and applied ethi-
cal thought to develop a new, bespoke account of what should shock the conscience of the court. We argue that because of 
language barriers, non-English-speaking players could end up signing unconscionable contracts, if not based on procedural 
or substantive unfairness, then potentially based on violations of their autonomy through deceptiveness. We also show that 
the current practice of players’ agents acting as ad hoc translators/interpreters raises serious ethical issues, not least lack of 
competency and impartiality. Following on from all this, we make a number of practical recommendations about how play-
ers’ representatives and clubs should conduct themselves, and what responsibilities they have to provide language support 
to non-English-speaking players in contract negotiations and signing meetings.
Keywords Applied ethics · English language proficiency · Translation/interpreting · Professional football · Unconscionable 
contracts
1 Introduction
Professional sport raises numerous issues of fairness, and 
football is no different: everything from the fairness of play-
ers simulating being fouled,1 to financial fair play rules,2 
and onto fairness in the distribution of prize money.3 This 
article is concerned with the question of whether English 
professional football clubs have the potential to take unfair 
advantage of, that is, exploit, non-English-speaking play-
ers during contract negotiations and signing meetings. To 
date, the literature on exploitation in professional sports 
has touched on various contexts of exploitation, including 
exploitation by professional sports organisations of profes-
sional sportspeople,4 of fans,5 and even of non-professional 
sports organisations which develop young talent.6 Our focus 
is the particular issue of whether English professional foot-
ball clubs have the potential to exploit migrant non-English-
speaking players before a ball is even kicked.7
We shall discuss cases where negotiations are conducted 
and contracts written, in English, despite the fact that the 
player’s ability to comprehend, speak, or read English is 
limited or non-existent. These include: (1) cases where the 
representative (intermediary or agent) who has brought the 
player to the UK has some English language ability and 
relays in translation what the player needs to know; (2) cases 
where the representative has little or no facility in the Eng-
lish language and is unable to translate the negotiations and 
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the contract for the player without, for example, recourse 
to automatic translation software (e.g. Google Translate); 
and (3) cases where the player has an entourage of five or 
more representatives, all of whom speak some English as 
a second or third language, but all of whom have differ-
ent interpretations of the wording of the negotiations and 
the contract. We are especially interested in cases involving 
players coming to English clubs from countries—including 
both developing countries in Africa or Latin America and 
other European countries—where English is not an official 
language, is not a lingua franca, or is typically not used by 
poorer, less educated people.
Although we focus on migrant non-English-speaking 
players, we compare their situation to English-speaking 
players throughout. We consider the ethical implications of 
contracts containing harsher terms or lower salary offers for 
players with little or no knowledge of the English language, 
compared to their more fluent counterparts. And we consider 
the ethics of non-English-speaking players being unable to 
understand negotiations and read contracts and, therefore, 
being more dependent on representatives in comparison with 
English-speaking players, whether or not the contracts actu-
ally contain similar terms and salary offers. Along the way, 
we also explore the actions of representatives themselves in 
potentially facilitating exploitative contracts and the ethical 
issues raised by individuals fulfilling the dual role of player 
representative and unqualified interpreter.
The remainder of the article unfolds as follows. Section 2 
provides a picture of the current state of play in the negotia-
tion and signing of English professional football contracts 
vis-à-vis the position and treatment of non-English-speaking 
players. The information derives from a series of semi-struc-
tured interviews with football agents, former migrant play-
ers, and player liaison/welfare officers who currently work 
or have previously worked in English professional leagues. 
These interviewees were asked about language support in 
the football industry, including the negotiation and signing 
of contracts.8 Whilst there has been considerable evolution 
in the awareness of the need to provide language support to 
migrant players during a period of initial adaptation to work-
ing in a new country, this is most in evidence at the higher 
end of the leagues, especially in clubs which have been 
established in the English Premier League for a number of 
years. Practices are much more patchy and ad hoc elsewhere, 
and this is reflected in the ways in which communication 
across language barriers can be managed in contract negotia-
tions and signings.
Following on from this, we attempt to justify our belief 
that there could be in some cases something exploitative 
about English professional football contracts signed by non-
English-speaking players, drawing on insights from legal, 
moral, and applied ethical thought.
In Sect. 3, we look at the legal doctrine of unconscionable 
contracts—including but also going beyond the relevant case 
law—and, more specifically, the notion of exploitation of 
weakness. We argue that this legal notion, once developed 
and strengthened, is clearly applicable to English profes-
sional football contracts signed by non-English-speaking 
players.
In Sect. 4, we draw on work in the field of normative 
jurisprudence to develop a new, bespoke account of what 
sorts of procedural and substantive unfairness, what forms of 
ignorance, and what types of violation of autonomy through 
deceptiveness, should shock the conscience of the court. We 
argue that these insights and developments provide the bases 
for robust and normatively fitting jurisprudential analyses of 
how English professional football contracts signed by non-
English-speaking players could be unconscionable.
In Sect. 5, we consider the ethically prior question of 
what an appropriate allocation of primary and secondary 
responsibilities for providing language support to non-
English-speaking players looks like. Taking note of recent 
developments in applied ethics (e.g. legal profession ethics, 
sports representative ethics, business ethics, interpreter eth-
ics, translation ethics), we examine these issues from the 
standpoint of players, players’ representatives, professional 
clubs, national football associations, and players’ unions or 
professional players’ associations. We put forward a new 
theory according to which primary and secondary responsi-
bilities for providing language support during contract nego-
tiations and signing meetings should be allocated according 
to both capacity and the existence of fiduciary relationships.
In Sect. 6, we contextualise the interpreted event of the 
negotiation of the contract between club, player, and player 
representatives, and of any discussion of the contract when 
it is physically signed, with interpreting in other professional 
settings. We also discuss some of the ethical issues raised by 
the use of an unqualified person or persons fulfilling a dual 
role of interpreter and player representative. Moreover, we 
briefly provide some thoughts on why clubs might behave as 
they currently do, but also why there are good economic and 
business reasons, as well as normative reasons, to do better.
Finally, in Sect. 7 we make a range of practical recom-
mendations, based on our legal, moral, and ethical reason-
ing, about how clubs and players’ representatives should 
conduct themselves, and what responsibilities they have to 
provide language support to non-English-speaking players 
in contract negotiations and signing meetings.
8 Although similar issues are likely to be faced by professional 
female migrant players, the percentage of such players working in 
England is much smaller (19.5%) than the percentage of male migrant 
players (69%), so we have focussed on male players. UEFA, 2016, 
Women’s football across the national associations 2016/2017, avail-
able at: http://www.uefa.com/insid euefa /footb all-devel opmen t/women 
s-footb all/news/newsi d=24313 55.html#/, consulted 17 December 
2017.
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2  The state of play in English professional 
football contracts vis‑à‑vis language 
support
There has been considerable migration of professional 
footballers into English professional leagues over the past 
20 years or so, to the extent that, in the 1995–1996 season, 
69% of English Premier League players were English but in 
2017–2018, only 31% were English with the remaining 69% 
sharing 65 different nationalities. Migration levels have also 
increased in the Championship where over 50% of players 
were migrants in 2017–2018, more than in the highest Ger-
man league, the Bundesliga.9 The linguistic diversity created 
by the presence of these elite migrant players has created a 
need for translation and interpreting10 and a slowly develop-
ing awareness that these players need language support.11 
Such support can be needed not simply during the period 
of employment (e.g. media interviews, interactions with a 
manager/coach, processes of finding accommodation and 
understanding tax requirements), and it is also needed dur-
ing the negotiation and signing of the contract. The latter 
will be our focus here.
In theory, language support could be delivered by clubs 
through the work of player liaison/welfare officers, by out-
sourced concierge or translation and interpreting services, 
or in an ad hoc way by particular employees of the club, 
such as physiotherapists or coaches who share the player’s 
first language. Such language support can also be secured 
independently of the club by the player, or the player’s rep-
resentative. Sometimes it is simply absent.
Much practice around negotiating and signing the con-
tract is undoubtedly conducted professionally, especially at 
the higher levels where migrant players coming to live and 
work in England will often have the language support they 
need. There is nonetheless evidence of some less profes-
sional practice, and we shall normatively evaluate this in 
the following sections. We will also discuss in Sect. 6 the 
common use of players’ agents, intermediaries, or lawyers 
in the dual role of players’ representatives and unqualified 
interpreters as one particular practice that raises professional 
ethical issues. But to anticipate slightly, the following two 
comments from agents operating in the English leagues 
show how minimal the emphasis can be on professionally 
communicating to the player the terms of the contract he is 
signing:
This is a particularly incredible area really […] at 
times it can be quite ethically challenging because I’ve 
yet to come across a football club ever that was willing 
to provide a translation of the paperwork that is being 
signed. I am expected to do my best at explaining to 
the player the effect of what they’re signing but the 
reality is a transaction, even this would apply down in 
League Two, is at least 60 or 70 pages worth of docu-
ments that they’re being presented with, sometimes 
at the high level hundreds of pages. I’m expected to 
explain to the player the effect of what they’re sign-
ing and satisfy myself that they understand. I’ve seen 
agents and players sign the documents within 30 s of 
them being presented to them and that player has no 
idea what he’s signing.12
It was down to me to check the agreement […] I didn’t 
have massive resources nor did the club I was work-
ing for, because they’re on a lower scale but we were 
dealing with a player who didn’t speak English, didn’t 
speak German, and we were dealing with agreements 
in both English and German. So I had to translate the 
German on the spot using automated translation to get 
some form of interpretation of it. It’s quite dangerous 
and the player’s trust is totally in the people around 
him and there’s a lot of people who will prey on him.13
3  Unconscionable contracts
As part of this research project, we undertook a survey of 
cases heard at the Court of Arbitration for Sport and cases 
heard in courts in England and Wales involving football con-
tracts. We found no cases of players challenging the legality 
of contracts on the grounds that the player lacked English 
language facility even though the contract was written in 
English and the contractual negotiations were conducted in 
English. The absence of such cases may be due to a culture 
of players not attempting to sue clubs for fear that doing so 
could damage their careers or harm their prospects going 
forward, not least because a player might not be able to play 
for the club whilst pursuing an action which could take years 
to reach its resolution. It may also reflect legal advice given 
to players that their lack of English language facility per se 
9 Sky Sports, 2017, Premier League has highest percentage of for-
eign players—UEFA report, available at: http://www.skysp orts.com/
footb all/news/11661 /10725 849/premi er-leagu e-has-highe st-perce 
ntage -of-forei gn-playe rs-8211-uefa-repor t, consulted 12 December 
2017.
10 Baines (2013).
11 Such awareness has perhaps been slow to develop, first, because 
football clubs and the sport’s institutional bodies have been tradition-
ally slow to modernise, run as they have often been by people from 
within the industry domestically rather than by individuals with a 
more intentional outlook and familiarity with operating internation-
ally, and, second, because governance and leadership in football is 
notoriously prone to instability. Either way, arguably such awareness 
should be an issue of corporate responsibility in football. See also 
Rosca (2011).
12 Football Agent 1.
13 Football Agent 3.
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does not currently fall into an established category of any 
recognised cause of action, or legal doctrine.
Even though the law is currently silent on these specific 
sorts of circumstances, in this section we shall nonetheless 
look at some of the potentially relevant causes of action and 
related case law to identify the sorts of cases that in theory 
players could bring. More importantly, in the next section 
we shall use methods in normative legal philosophy to argue 
that certain established categories of recognised causes of 
actions, specifically relating to the doctrine of unconscion-
able contracts and the associated legal concepts of proce-
dural and substantive unfairness and moral reprehensibility, 
should be freshly analysed, in ways that would, if adopted 
by courts, open up the possibility of players bringing such 
cases in the future.
We begin, however, by discounting two other legal doc-
trines. The first is contractual incapacity. This typically 
requires that one of the parties has a cognitive inability to 
understand the contract, even if it were properly explained 
in a language he speaks. Instead, we are interested in cases 
where a lack of understanding is caused by an absence of 
English language proficiency.
The second is non est factum. This can be invoked if the 
substance of a contract is fundamentally different from what 
one of the parties intended to execute or sign. Assuming that 
a player has a basic grasp that they are signing a contract to 
be a professional footballer at an English club, it is unlikely 
that a court would accept that the contract is fundamentally 
different from what the player thought he was signing, even 
if the player cannot read or understand English.
Of more likely relevance, we think, is the doctrine of 
unconscionable contract. According to Andrew Burrows, 
for instance, this doctrine is used ‘to protect the claimant 
against a weakness (whether a mental weakness or one aris-
ing from the claimant’s difficult circumstances)’,14 albeit ‘the 
weakness is not so extreme as to constitute incapacity’.15
Weakness alone is not enough, however. A contract 
becomes unconscionable only if one party takes advantage 
of a weakness (a procedural element) in order to get the 
other party to enter into a contract which is significantly 
weighted against the interests of the latter (a substantive ele-
ment), and in a way that offends or shocks the conscience 
of the court. In other words, it must be demonstrated that 
one party achieved a one-sided or unfair bargain because it 
exploited a weakness, and in a morally reprehensible manner 
according to the norms of the society.16
What does the test of moral reprehensibility add? One 
potential way to conceive of this—moving beyond but we 
hope also enhancing the extant case law—is in terms of the 
stronger party having knowledge, actual or constructive, of 
the other party’s weakness. This means either that A knows 
of B’s weakness (actual knowledge) or that A would have 
known of B’s weakness had A taken proper steps to try to 
know it (constructive knowledge). For instance, if A had 
suspicions, or can be reasonably expected to have concerns, 
as to the fact of B’s weakness, yet deliberately decided not to 
make any further enquiries, then A can be said to have had 
constructive knowledge of B’s weakness (even if A lacked 
actual knowledge). Following on from this general line of 
thinking, in the next section we propose a new analysis 
or test for ‘a morally reprehensible manner’ of exploiting 
a weakness based on the occurrence of deceptiveness and 
damage to the value of autonomy (in making contracts). 
However, we begin with a discussion of the link between 
the idea of exploiting a weakness and the idea of unequal 
bargaining power.
According to Burrows, judges and legal scholars have 
sometimes used the terms ‘unequal bargaining power’ and 
‘unconscionability’ interchangeably.17 The nature and form 
of this weakness can vary according to the circumstances 
of the case. In Lloyds Bank Ltd v. Bundy,18 for example, 
Lord Denning sets out the following categories of weakness: 
‘the English law gives relief to one who, without independ-
ent advice, enters into a contract on terms which are very 
unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is 
grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously 
impaired by reason of his own needs or desires, or by his 
own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influences 
or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit of 
the other’.19 Arguably Denning made the statement in the 
context of seeking to draw a link between many vitiating 
factors, almost seeking to create a new doctrine of inequality 
of bargaining power.
Interestingly, the foregoing lines of jurisprudential think-
ing about weakness have also emerged in the wider context 
of lawsuits in the entertainment industry (of which sport is a 
part). Consider the House of Lords judgments in Schroeder 
v. Macaulay20 and Clifford Davis Management Ltd v. WEA 
Records Ltd,21 a case involving Fleetwood Mac. In both 
cases, musicians were released from contracts which con-
tained onerous terms in the context of inequality of bargain-
ing power.22
14 Burrows (2011), p. 300.
15 Ibid.
16 Burrows (2011), ch 12; (2016), ch. 15.
17 Burrows (2011), p. 301; (2016), p. 835.
18 Consider Lloyds Bank v. Bundy [1974] 3 All ER 757 at 763 (Lord 
Denning).
19 Ibid., at 765.
20 [1974] 1 WLR 1308.
21 [1975] 1 All E.R. 237.
22 Slayton (1976).
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Over time new categories of weakness have emerged 
of particular relevance to our enquiry, most notably cases 
of language and comprehension difficulties.23 In Portman 
Building Society v. Dusangh and others,24 for instance, the 
court considered a case of a signatory to a remortgage con-
tract who had come to England from India in 1964 and, 
despite being resident for many years, at the time of sign-
ing the contract had poor understanding of spoken English 
and was illiterate. Ultimately the Court of Appeal concluded 
that Dusangh had understood the contract because he had 
grasped to a sufficient degree the verbal explanations he had 
received. Nevertheless, courts in the USA have accepted the 
offeree’s inability to read the language in which the contract 
was written as meeting the requirements of an unconscion-
able contract (exploitation of weakness) if discrepancies 
exist between what was presented to the offeree during the 
contractual negotiations conducted in the offeree’s mother 
tongue and what was actually contained in the contract writ-
ten in a language the offeree does not understand.25
What of sports contracts? That such contracts can be 
unconscionable is not a new proposition. In the legal dispute 
between Rory McIlroy and Horizon Sports, for example, 
applications were sent to the Commercial Court in Dublin 
in 2013 by McIlroy’s lawyers—prior to the case being set-
tled out of court—in which they invoked the doctrine of 
unconscionable contract. They highlighted the size of the 
percentage of on course and off course earnings being paid 
to the management company (substantive element), and the 
weakness of McIlroy at the time of the contract due to his 
age, and having no independent legal and financial advice 
on hand at the time of signing the contract, namely the day 
of Horizon’s Christmas party (procedural element).26 More 
recently, Bryant Lee has applied the doctrine of unconscion-
able contract to college football scholarships in the USA, 
arguing inter alia that because these scholarships involve 
young American football players being put at significant risk 
of traumatic brain injury this makes the bargain ‘too harsh’ 
or ‘one-sided’ and, therefore, unconscionable.27 The doc-
trine of unconscionable contracts has also been discussed 
in some of the philosophical literature on exploitation in 
sport.28
Drawing on these developments in the doctrine of uncon-
scionable contracts, it is not difficult to see how a player’s 
inability to speak, comprehend, or read English could make 
some English professional football contracts unconscion-
able. To be clear, we believe the doctrine is applicable not 
only to facts about the language in which the negotiations 
were conducted but also to facts about the language in which 
the contract was written—facts including the absence of pro-
fessional translators and translations.
We also believe that the idea of a stronger party acting in 
a morally reprehensible way in virtue of knowingly taking 
advantage of the other party’s weakness in order to achieve 
a one-sided bargain is highly relevant to some English pro-
fessional football contracts involving non-English-speaking 
players. In the case of actual knowledge, a court can ask: Did 
the club know the player lacked even basic facility in the 
English language? In the case of constructive knowledge, it 
can ask: Would the club have known that the player lacked 
this facility had it taken reasonable steps to find out?
We also recognise that when professional clubs leave 
players’ representatives to look after the interpreting of the 
negotiations and signing meetings, they can unwittingly 
leave space for the agent to manipulate the proceedings, 
potentially to the advantage of the agent and to the detri-
ment of the club and the player.
4  The moral reprehensibility 
of unconscionable contracts
The account of exploitation of weakness outlined above 
speaks to what would shock the conscience of the court, 
cashed out in terms of certain classes of cases or categories 
identified by precedent. However, are there any moral rea-
sons for thinking that courts ought to recognise language 
deficit as a category of unconscionable contract? After all, 
the Human Rights Act 1998 declares the right to free assis-
tance of an interpreter in court settings. In other words, could 
there be a rational basis for courts judging that a language 
deficit constituted unequal bargaining power (the procedural 
element) and that the resulting bargain was significantly one-
sided or harsh (substantive element) under circumstances 
worthy of shocking the conscience of the court? In this sec-
tion, we are going beyond actual case law to give a norma-
tive jurisprudential analysis of what contract law could and 
should say in the cases we are looking at.
We shall begin by enquiring whether English professional 
football contracts signed by non-English-speaking players 
could be substantively unconscionable. It might be espe-
cially important to determine this in cases where it is diffi-
cult to discover what happened during the negotiations and, 
therefore, hard to determine whether there was any unequal 
bargaining power (procedural element). Sometimes courts 
might be unable to get to the bottom of just how much Eng-
lish language facility the player had or just how much of 
23 Burrows (2016), pp. 842–4.
24 [2000] All ER (D) 582.
25 Consider Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc.2d 26 (N.Y. Misc. 
1966), at 27; Albert Merrill School v. Godoy, 78 Misc.2d 647 (1974), 
at 650.
26 This case is cited in Barry et al. (2016, 157–8).
27 Lee (2017).
28 Wertheimer (1996), ch 2.
 The International Sports Law Journal
1 3
the contractual negotiations and the contract was translated 
into a language the player could understand. Here, as Alan 
Wertheimer has suggested, the substantive unconscionabil-
ity of the bargain could be utilised as ‘a proxy for proce-
dural unconscionability in the face of the epistemological 
problems’.29
We assume that in order to make a non-arbitrary assess-
ment of substantive unconscionability courts will need to 
light upon an independent criterion of fairness that does not 
prejudge the issue. But this may be easier said than done. 
Consider the terms of the contract. Suppose a non-English-
speaking player signs a 1-year deal which includes an option 
clause allowing the club to unilaterally extend the contract 
a determined number of times, for a determined number 
of years, and with a determined (modest) increase in sal-
ary. Option clauses enable clubs to take calculated risks 
on unproven players, with the expectation that some play-
ers will work out but many will not. It strikes us as highly 
unlikely that an English court would adopt a criterion of 
fairness which stipulates that all option clauses are one-sided 
or too harsh. For one thing, section C.1. (j) (xiii) of the Rules 
of the Football Association Limited (the FA rules) vindi-
cates option clauses (with certain provisos). Moreover, in 
England option clauses are commonplace in standard form 
players’ contracts, which themselves can be viewed as a 
product of some degree of collective bargaining between 
the Professional Footballers’ Association (PFA) and pro-
fessional clubs.30 To be sure, the legality of contracts of 
employment in professional football is sensitive to English 
common law,31 but English courts would require a very pow-
erful reason to adopt a blanket ruling against option clauses 
in the face of the aforementioned FA rules and de facto col-
lective bargaining.
In reality, there are some good reasons not to treat option 
clauses as contractual pariahs. When clubs sign players, 
they do so based on predictive expectations of future per-
formance levels—reflecting assessments of the player’s past 
performance and estimations of how well the player will 
adapt to the club’s training methods and playing style. Dif-
ferent players are more or less risky investments for football 
clubs given myriad factors relating not only to physical and 
mental skills, talents, traits, and dispositions, but also to 
personal circumstances such as age, marriage status, fam-
ily background, country of origin, and level of education. 
This means the salary and the terms offered to a player who 
has tremendous potential but is also a risky prospect—sup-
pose only 1 in 10 of players of this sort fully realise their 
potential—are unlikely to be the same as are offered to a 
player who has to some extent already realised their poten-
tial. The level of risk exposure to the club is inevitably 
reflected in the substance of the contract—in the salary or 
in the terms or both. A club might offer a 1-year contract to 
an unproven player on a relatively favourable salary, but in 
order to reflect the level of risk the club might include an 
option clause. Thus, although the option clause might seem 
one-sided or harsh taken in isolation, overall the contract 
might not be one-sided or harsh if one also considers the 
salary and the risk.32
More importantly for our study, option clauses are not 
peculiar to contracts signed by players coming to English 
clubs from abroad and who do not speak English. As indi-
cated by Football Agent 1, option clauses seem to be a fixture 
of contracts offered to younger players across the board. If 
the terms offered in standard form English professional foot-
ball contracts are precisely that, standard, then at first glance 
non-English-speaking players would not have any greater or 
lesser cause to complain that their contracts are substantively 
unfair than their English-speaking counterparts.
Then again, perhaps substantive unconscionability could 
stem from the greater burdens and risks borne by non-Eng-
lish-speaking players due to circumstances contingently con-
nected with their language deficit. Consider a player who is 
recruited from Latin America. In moving to an English club, 
he carries the burden of a change in climate, culture, and 
lifestyle which may not be to his liking. Due to visa restric-
tions, he might be unable to immediately—or ever—bring 
with him certain family members. Then there is the risk of a 
crushing sense of failure (psychic damage) in circumstances 
where the player leaves his home and travels half way around 
the world to start a new life in England only to be told after 
1 year that he has not made the grade. If his visa is connected 
to his employment, he may then have to leave the country: 
a further upheaval. Thus, even if similar terms are offered 
to migrant, non-English-speaking players—such as option 
clauses—this belies extra levels of burden and risk shoul-
dered by such players.
However, rational judgements as to the substantive 
unconscionability of contracts must always take into con-
sideration the terms, the salary, and the risk on both sides. 
And so it is possible that the salary offers made by English 
clubs to migrant, non-English-speaking players make up for 
the extra burdens or risks those players must bear. Indeed, it 
could be that if courts adopt a criterion of fairness that com-
pares what migrant, non-English-speaking players expect 
to gain from the contracts (against a baseline of having no 
contract or receiving the average salary of professional foot-
ball players in their own countries) with the clubs’ expected 
32 Wertheimer (1996), pp. 55–58.
29 Wertheimer (1996), pp. 54–55.
30 O’Leary (2017), p. 208.
31 See, for example, Eastham v. Newcastle United Football Club Ltd 
and Others [1963] 3 All ER 139.
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gains (against a baseline of only signing English-speaking 
players), it could be that the gains are broadly equal and so 
the contracts are not substantively unconscionable.
Nevertheless, an alternative way of thinking about sub-
stantive unconscionability is in terms of whether the club’s 
salary offer was miserly by comparison with the club’s nor-
mal salary offer for such a player or by comparison with the 
going rate for such a player in the market—as opposed to 
comparing what the player and the club each gained. Once 
again, however, determining the club’s normal salary offer 
or the going rate in the market may not be straightforward. 
For one thing, there is the problem of establishing the right 
cohort of comparison. There should be no simplistic com-
parisons between the salaries of non-English-speaking play-
ers and English-speaking players for at least two reasons. 
First, due to circumstances contingently connected with a 
player being unable to speak English—such as the player 
coming from a developing country—clubs are likely to face 
higher administrative costs in identifying, scouting, and 
negotiating with non-English-speaking players. Second, 
English language proficiency could both directly and indi-
rectly impact the player’s expected performance level. Con-
sider the player’s coachability, leadership skills, contribution 
to team spirit, ability to settle into the wider community, 
marketability, and aptitude for handling media duties and 
work in the local community.33 For both of these reasons, a 
player’s lack of English language facility will probably be 
one factor—even if not the key factor—in determining the 
going rate for the player. As a result, offering a lower sal-
ary to non-English-speaking players compared to otherwise 
equivalent English-speaking players might not be substan-
tively unfair or unconscionable.
The technical challenges of making fair comparisons 
between players’ salaries do not end there, however. Even 
discounting simplistic comparisons between the salaries of 
English-speaking and non-English-speaking players, it could 
be that each individual player possesses a skill set so unique 
that it is impossible to compare any two players, even two 
non-English-speaking players. In that event, there is no such 
thing as what the club normally pays for a certain type of 
player, only what the club is actually willing to pay at a 
given moment in time for a particular player. Furthermore, 
even if it is possible to compare players of broadly similar 
types (skill sets), it could be that there is a very wide margin 
of error over the going rate in the market, meaning that it 
becomes difficult to ascertain if a salary offer really is exces-
sively or disproportionately below the going rate. It could 
be that the going rate is so wildly fluctuating over time that 
even comparing today’s price for a player with a certain skill 
set with yesterday’s price is impossible.
Notwithstanding these technical challenges, courts 
might adopt the pragmatic rule that a contract is substan-
tively unfair or unconscionable only if it grossly underpays 
a player by comparison with the going rate for such a type 
of player. But this still leaves plenty of ambiguity. Maybe 
a court should not be shocked if a club pays a particular 
non-English-speaking player slightly less than the going rate 
for equivalent non-English-speaking players, yet shocked if 
the non-English-speaking player receives significantly less. 
However, it may appear arbitrary the point at which a salary 
below the going rate becomes sufficiently below the going 
rate as to offend the conscience of the court. That being 
said, one solution would be for a higher court to establish a 
clear precedent according to which an English professional 
football contract is substantively unconscionable only when 
the player is paid not even half the going rate for his ser-
vices. In justifying this move, the court could appeal to the 
Roman law injury of laesio ultra dimidium vel enormis (‘loss 
beyond half or greater’). In this way, it is theoretically pos-
sible, we believe, for a court to non-arbitrarily determine that 
a contract is substantially unfair because the salary is grossly 
below the going rate.
Even assuming that the foregoing problems are not insur-
mountable, there remains the task of identifying an inde-
pendent moral criterion to determine whether the parties 
have met on unequal terms or with unequal bargaining power 
(the procedural element). Bargaining power normally means 
the comparative ability of each party to exert influence on 
the other party, such as to drive upwards or downwards the 
terms offered by the other party, based on the compara-
tive cost or burden to each party of an agreement not being 
reached. In layman’s terms, the club might have higher bar-
gaining power relative to the player if the club is the only 
club offering the player a contract and if the club has other 
players of similar quality it could sign.
However, it is not immediately obvious why a language 
deficit on the part of the player in itself would constitute an 
unequal bargaining position. An unequal or weak bargain-
ing position is not the same as a weakness in the ability to 
comprehend the negotiation as it unfolds. After all, it is not 
difficult to imagine scenarios in which a player is unable to 
speak the language of the negotiation yet nevertheless enjoys 
a higher bargaining power relative to the club, such as if the 
player has uncommon or exceptional talent, has offers on the 
table from several clubs, plays a position on the pitch that 
the club is desperate to fill, and so forth.
However, it might be appropriate or fitting for courts, 
in such cases, to think about not only bargaining power 
in the above sense but also bargaining capacity. This is a 
matter of whether or not the parties to the contract have 
equal capacity, skill, expertise and so on, in negotiating the 
33 Even if a club also plans to invest in English language training 
for that player, it cannot be certain in advance how the player will 
respond to that training and how quickly.
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terms of the contract. For example, does one of the par-
ties have significantly less bargaining capacity in terms of 
providing and articulating reasons, arguments and persua-
sive considerations as to why they should receive a better 
deal than is currently being offered? This could happen if, 
for instance, the negotiations are being done in English and 
the player does not speak English. He is then reliant on the 
agent to have bargaining capacity on his behalf. But what 
if the agent is not fluent in English, or is not fluent in the 
player’s language? These circumstances could diminish the 
bargaining capacity of the player and/or his agent, thus cre-
ating another form of procedural inequality besides strict 
unequal bargaining power. In this way, we are proposing or 
suggesting a particular future development of the doctrine 
of unconscionable contracts that speaks to the types of cases 
we are interested in.
Furthermore, even sticking within the framework of une-
qual bargaining power, in the case of non-English-speaking 
players this unequal bargaining power could be understood 
in terms of other circumstances contingently connected with 
their language deficit. For example, an important bargain-
ing chip for migrant players coming into English football is 
interest from other European clubs. Yet this depends on the 
player being on the radar of a range of clubs, which in turn 
reflects the level of football infrastructure in the player’s 
home country, including the number of professional clubs, 
how many youngsters are playing at grass roots level, the 
strength of national football associations, players’ unions, 
and so on. If the player lives in a country where very few 
European clubs regularly send scouts, then the player is 
more likely to end up with a single offer on the table, if he is 
lucky. If the player wants to go professional, he has no real 
alternative but to accept whatever non-negotiable terms are 
offered.34
However, unconscionable contracts also require that the 
unequal bargaining power brought about a substantively 
unfair or unconscionable bargain. No matter how unequal 
the bargaining power, it would be far more difficult to sustain 
the charge that a contract is unconscionable, morally and 
legally, in the absence of evidence that the terms of the bar-
gain were also substantively unfair, and as a direct result of 
the unequal bargaining power.35 On the other hand, it may be 
especially important to prove procedural unconscionability 
in circumstances where it is hard to judge whether a bar-
gain was substantially unfair, such as when it is difficult to 
determine what the going rate for such a player actually was 
and there is a wide margin of error as to substantive uncon-
scionability. Unequal bargaining power is not merely partly 
constitutive of unconscionability; sometimes, it also sign-
posts, indicates, or suggests the presence of a substantively 
unfair or unconscionable bargain in cases where substantive 
unfairness is difficult to judge for some reason. Then again, 
that the process or circumstances of bargaining were unfair 
could only ever be prima facie evidence and never decisive 
evidence of substantive unfairness in the resulting contract.
A further aspect of the doctrine of unconscionable con-
tracts that stands in need of normative theorisation is the 
idea that it is morally reprehensible to knowingly take 
advantage of another’s weakness. Perhaps courts are more 
likely to be shocked if the stronger party had knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of what it was doing. But we must 
ask: why is it wrong to knowingly take advantage of another 
party’s weakness in a bargaining situation? And, how might 
this relate to the case of English professional football con-
tracts involving non-English-speaking players?
One thought could be that as soon as one contracting 
party does know or should know of the weakness of the 
other contracting party, then the former has a moral duty not 
to play on the weakness of the latter. However, it is unclear 
why parties have a moral duty not to play on the weakness 
of another party in a bargaining situation merely because 
they have knowledge of the weakness, actual or constructive. 
For example, arguably there would be nothing reprehensible 
in itself, other things remaining equal, about a club know-
ing that the player has no other offers on the table and set-
ting its offer accordingly to get the best deal it can, just as 
there would be nothing reprehensible in itself about a player 
knowing that the club is in desperate need of a player to play 
the left midfield position and in the light of this refusing to 
accept a low offer from the club. Part of the purpose of bar-
gaining is that it brings together two sides who each want the 
best possible deal for themselves, producing a result where 
both sides gain. To require those involved in negotiations to 
give up the posture of self-interest and take up instead an 
altruistic attitude seems overly demanding.
Perhaps, then, the moral reprehensibility has something 
to do with how, or the manner in which, parties go about 
playing on the weakness of the other side. For example, if 
the relevant weakness is the inability of the offeree to read 
the contract, then playing on the weakness would appear 
to involve a form of deception. To hide or conceal terms 
in the written contract by omitting to declare them to the 
other party reeks of dishonesty or bargaining in bad faith, 
especially if there is no morally relevant difference between 
acts and omissions when it comes to the vice of dishonesty.36 
Arguable even a substantively fair contract could be none-
theless procedurally unconscionable if it was procured in 
a morally reprehensible way—such as if the club does not 
36 See Burrows (2011), p. 300; (2016), p. 835.
34 See also Lee (2017), pp. 630–3.
35 See Feinberg (1986), pp. 251–2; Wertheimer (1996), p. 51; Bur-
rows (2011), p. 300; (2016), p. 834; Lee (2017), p. 626.
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make plain to the player in his first language the fact that 
an option clause is unilateral to the club only, especially if 
the club knows (or should make an effort to know) that the 
player is signing the contract under the mistaken assumption 
that he will be able to opt out at the end of the contractual 
period.
Non-English-speaking players might be taken advan-
tage of in the aforementioned ways (morally reprehensible 
procedural unconscionability) precisely because the con-
text pits especially poorly informed offerees against highly 
knowledgeable offerors.37 In the words of Football Agent 3: 
‘[If] say you’ve got an African player moving from a French 
club to an English club you’ve got three potential languages, 
how easy would it be to pull the wool over the eyes of one 
player?’.38
On the other side, if the club does not invest in an inter-
preter and allows the player’s agent to do the translation and 
interpreting during the negotiations and contract signing, 
this may put the club at a disadvantage in that they do not 
have access to how and what information is conveyed to the 
player, and may not receive accurate and timely informa-
tion about what the player is thinking and saying. Whether 
this disadvantage is morally troubling, however, depends on 
whether one also finds that the club has been responsible 
for putting itself into this disadvantageous position, despite 
having the wherewithal to fund independent translators. The 
same might not be true of players if they are unable to fund 
these services. We shall return to these issues of responsibil-
ity and capacity in Sect. 5.
Note, we are not suggesting that concealment of facts 
in bargaining situations is always and necessarily morally 
reprehensible. It may be that a customised ethics of bargain-
ing would permit ‘not letting on’ to the other party just how 
desperately one needs what it is they are offering (i.e. bluff-
ing).39 Nevertheless, it is another thing to conceal features 
of the bargain, to attempt to hide terms that one believes 
the other party might reject if they knew about them. This 
could be morally reprehensible because it fails to live up to 
one of the central virtues of bargaining, namely honesty, 
where lack of honesty puts at risk the continued existence 
of the valuable social practice of bargaining and the mutual 
gains that flow from this practice. Therefore, to say that the 
offerer has a moral duty not to play on the weakness of the 
offeree could be simply to say that the offerer should refrain 
from acting deceptively by attempting to hide terms in the 
contract without declaring them.
However, what about cases where the club did not have 
knowledge, actual or constructive, of the true extent of the 
player’s lack of English facility? Could there be a credible 
moral justification for a court deeming the contract uncon-
scionable even in such cases? We believe so. Another way 
of justifying, both morally and legally, the claim that Eng-
lish professional football contracts signed by players who 
lack even basic English proficiency can be unconscionable 
contracts is by arguing that such contracts could fail to 
respect and realise the autonomy of the players. This strat-
egy invokes the value of autonomy as a basis for both the 
principle that contracts should normally be respected and 
the limiting principle that when certain vitiating factors are 
present contracts should not be respected. The particular 
form of autonomy at stake here is the capacity to make bar-
gains with others and to create legal obligations based on 
the formalisation of those bargains.40 And so we maintain 
that a contract respects and promotes autonomy in the rel-
evant sense only if the parties have a reasonable level of 
comprehension about what it is they are bargaining for. The 
extreme cases would be non est factum. But perhaps at the 
less extreme end of this spectrum of autonomy-undermining 
contracts would be contracts signed by people with signifi-
cant language deficits. The thought would be that even this 
lesser degree of diminished autonomy can justify the use 
of the label ‘unconscionable’ (morally regrettable) even in 
circumstances where the clubs lacked knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of the language deficit.
Along these lines, we reason that when both the negotia-
tions and the contract are in English—as is usually the case 
in the UK but interestingly not in other European countries 
where contracts tend to be provided in translation41—this 
increases the risk that a non-English-speaking player will 
not have a reasonable level of comprehension about what is 
being bargained about, and therefore decreases the chances 
that he will get the legal obligations that he actually wills. 
This is more than the minimal expectation that the player 
should have a basic comprehension that he is negotiating 
about and signing a contract to play professional football 
for an English club. It is the fair expectation that the player 
should have an opportunity of achieving a reasonable level 
of comprehension concerning a sizeable proportion of the 
negotiations and the contract, or at the very least key parts 
thereof.
To illustrate, suppose a contract contains an option 
clause allowing the club to unilaterally extend the contract 
a determined number of times for similar remuneration, 
or else contains a provision stipulating that whilst most of 
the remuneration package will take the form of a monthly 
wage, a significant proportion will be payments for image 
rights, and paid to a separate image rights company. If a 
37 cf. Wertheimer (1996), p. 61.
38 Football Agent 3.
39 See Carr (1968).
40 See Fried (1981); (2014); Raz (1982); Chen-Wishart (2014).
41 Football Agent 2; Football Agent 3.
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non-English-speaking player cannot read the contract in 
English, nor comprehend much of the explanations about the 
contract offered in English, to know that these clauses and 
provisions are present, he may end up creating legal obliga-
tions other that what he willed. Although the player may 
have willed the creation of legal obligations around being 
a professional footballer for an English club for a period of 
time, he may not have willed the creation of the club’s uni-
lateral right to renew the contract and may not have willed 
the creation of an elaborate tax evasion scheme.42
Of course, both clubs and players’ representatives will 
often assert or argue that non-English-speaking players do 
understand what is going on, and have comprehension of 
key parts of the contract being signed. But we believe that, 
both morally and legally, these assertions cannot be taken 
at face value, but must be scrutinised and, where necessary, 
challenged. At the very least there should be evidence that 
adequate language support has been provided to the player.
Of course, at this stage it might be objected that very 
often even English-speaking players do not pay much atten-
tion to contractual negotiations and are only dimly aware 
of the substance of the contracts they sign having not both-
ered to read them in full or at all.43 Does this mean that all 
football contracts are unconscionable? However, we would 
respond to this objection by insisting that at least English-
speaking players have the opportunity to pay attention to the 
negotiations and to read the contract they are signing. If they 
fail to take the opportunity, then they lack actual comprehen-
sion, but they do not lack the opportunity for comprehen-
sion. In some circumstances, non-English-speaking players 
may lack both, and this poses a threat to their autonomy 
which is both different in kind and degree to the challenges 
faced by English-speaking players in dealing with contracts.
We also note that sometimes the aforementioned lack of 
opportunity could be partly down to limited English lan-
guage facility and partly due to the actions of the club. Sup-
pose a player has good enough English to be able to under-
stand the negotiations and even to read the crucial parts of 
the contract given sufficient time, but the club is imposing 
severe time constraints on the negotiations and on the read-
ing of the contract—requiring the deal to be done and the 
contract to be signed in a matter of days, hours, or even 
minutes ahead of the closing of the transfer window.44 This 
lack of opportunity also fails to respect and promote the 
autonomy of the player. It could also render the contract 
procedurally unconscionable irrespective of why the relevant 
time constraints are being imposed—the club might not be 
imposing the time constraints artificially to take advantage 
of the weakness of the player, but could itself be reacting 
to the departure of another player and the need to sign a 
replacement before the close of the transfer window.
5  Primary and secondary responsibilities 
for providing language support
Thus far, we have argued that if an English professional 
football club plays on the weakness of non-English-speak-
ing players this could, under certain circumstances, make 
for unconscionable contracts. However, we might face the 
objection that by focusing on the conduct of clubs we have 
only told part of the story. For example, it is one thing to ask 
how clubs should treat players who cannot speak the lan-
guage in which negotiations are conducted and the contract 
is written; it is quite another thing to ask whose responsi-
bility it is in the first instance to ensure that such players 
do receive the language support they need, such as in the 
shape of an interpreter present during negotiations and the 
signing of the contract, and/or the provision of a translated 
version of the contract. After all, if non-English-speaking 
players procured for themselves the language support they 
needed or if their representatives provided professional lan-
guage support, then this would go a long way to removing 
the spectre of procedural unfairness, the risk of substantive 
unfairness, and the threat to autonomy. So some of our ethi-
cal arguments above are dependent on our saying something 
convincing about what an appropriate allocation of respon-
sibilities for providing language support would look like.
First things first, where does the burden of proof rest? 
Does it rest with the club to show that players or players’ 
representatives have the primary responsibility? Or does the 
burden rest with the latter to show that the club has primary 
responsibility? We shall not seek to make arguments that 
shift the burden of proof in one direction rather than another. 
Instead, we propose to tackle the issue head on by outlining a 
substantive normative account of the appropriate allocation 
of responsibilities for providing language support.
Our account appeals to both capacity—that responsibil-
ity tracks whichever party is most capable—and the exist-
ence of fiduciary relationships—that responsibility also 
tracks whichever party has a duty of care. Based on this, we 
would argue that players’ representatives bear the primary 
responsibility for ensuring players receive the language sup-
port they need during contractual negotiations and signing. 
For one thing, players’ representatives are often in the best 
position to judge whether or not a player needs language 
assistance, since they know the players better than the club. 
Certain representatives might also specialise in dealing with 
unsigned players from particular countries and may have 
42 As identified by Football Agent 3, a provision concerning pay-
ments for image rights could even render a player liable to criminal 
prosecution for tax evasion under the Criminal Finances Act 2017.
43 Football Agent 1.
44 Football Agent 3; Player Liaison Officer 3.
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local knowledge about who could potentially translate for the 
players during the early stages of making contact with clubs 
and starting negotiations. However, to clarify, we are only 
suggesting here that players’ representatives normally have a 
primary responsibility to ensure that players receive the lan-
guage support they need, not that representatives have a pri-
mary responsibility to act as interpreters themselves. They 
lack the professional training and independence required for 
the latter. We shall say more on this in the next section.
That players’ representatives have a primary responsibil-
ity to provide language support also flows, we believe, from 
the fiduciary relationship between players’ representatives 
and players—or, more specifically, from duties of care and 
standards of diligence and integrity that normally define 
these sorts of relationships. It is generally recognised that 
players’ representatives have a fiduciary obligation to pur-
sue the best interests of their players (duty of care) and to 
do so with competence (standard of diligence). Arguably, 
this means ensuring that the client receives the necessary 
language support when entering into contractual negotia-
tions or signing a contract in a foreign language, either by 
procuring language support privately or by seeking language 
support from a national football association or professional 
players’ association.
We note here that English courts accept the basic proposi-
tion that players’ representatives have at least some fiduciary 
duties towards the professional players they represent.45 We 
observe as well that presently English football intermediar-
ies must register, and sign an Intermediaries Agreement, 
with the FA, in which they agree to the FA Intermediaries 
Regulations.46 Although these regulations do not specifi-
cally refer to language difficulties experienced by players, 
they do include the following general principle: ‘A Club, 
Player, Intermediary or other Participant must not so arrange 
matters as to conceal or misrepresent the reality and/or sub-
stance of any matters in relation to a Transaction’. Failing to 
arrange for translation/interpreting services could potentially 
fall foul of this general principle, we believe.
Interestingly, the FA Intermediaries Regulations also 
require persons seeking to act as intermediaries to satisfy 
the FA’s Test of Good Character and Reputation for Interme-
diaries.47 Presently the Test merely sets out certain disquali-
fying factors—including, for instance, having unspent crimi-
nal convictions, bankruptcy, not being registered or being 
suspended from registration as an intermediary with the FA. 
There is no mention of ‘duty of care’, ‘standards of diligence 
and integrity’, and so forth. This surely needs to change. 
Specifically, we believe there is a pressing need for the FA 
and/or a voluntary association like the Society of Football 
Intermediaries and Agents (SOFIA) to introduce a code of 
conduct for football intermediaries that would formalise the 
norms of professionalism, the elements of best practice, and 
the high ethical standards that can be reasonably expected 
of English football intermediaries, including in relation to 
the provision of language support for players. For example, 
such a code might stipulate that it is best practice for agents/
intermediaries to identify the English language proficiency 
(or lack thereof) of their clients and, if they have capacity, 
to arrange the provision of interpreters for contract negotia-
tions and signing, or else to call upon the club to make these 
arrangements, if it has the capacity.
In fact, the above suggestions are not without precedent 
in related areas. In terms of general fiduciary duties, we 
note that the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) Code 
of Conduct states that solicitors must ‘act in the best inter-
ests of each client’ and ‘provide a proper standard of service 
to [their] clients’.48 In terms of the provision of language 
support specifically, we highlight further that the right to 
an interpreter is enshrined in EU Law for criminal proceed-
ings,49 and is part of policy or codes of practice for a range 
of community interpreting encounters such as in healthcare, 
immigration, and police contexts.50 All of these situations 
involve institutions which in principle have a duty of care to 
the people who need interpreting support.
Now we also recognise that such ethical standards have 
rarely been applied in commercial contexts, within which 
professional football indubitably sits. At present, there are no 
policies or codes of conduct promoting the use of interpret-
ers. Indeed, according to Ozolins, partly due to commercial 
confidentiality rules and the reluctance of such interpret-
ers to go on record, this is the area of interpreting which is 
the least researched and the least thought about in terms of 
ethics.51 We nevertheless think that this status quo should 
change.
Specifically, we propose that it is the primary responsibil-
ity of players’ intermediaries to provide English language 
support in contract negotiations and signing meetings, pro-
vided they have this capacity. It seems highly unlikely that 
a young non-English-speaking player from a developing 
45 Consider Imageview Management Ltd v. Kelvin Jack [2009] 
EWCA Civ 63.
46 FA Intermediaries Regulations, July 2017. Available at: http://
www.thefa .com/footb all-rules -gover nance /polic ies/inter media ries/
regul ation -and-forms .
47 Available at: http://www.thefa .com/~/media /files /thefa porta l/gover 
nance -docs/agent s/inter media ries/31%20mar ch/test-of-good-chara 
cter-and-reput ation -for-inter media ries.ashx.
48 Available at: https ://www.sra.org.uk/solic itors /handb ook/code/.
49 Available at: https ://www.eurom ed-justi ce.eu/en/docum ent/eu-
2010-direc tive-2010-64-eu-europ ean-parli ament -and-counc il-20-oc-
tob er-2010-right .
50 Hale (2007).
51 Ozolins (2014), p. 30.
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country who is entering into contractual negotiations with 
an English professional football club for his first ever pro-
fessional contract would have the financial capacity to pro-
cure the services of an interpreter for the relevant meetings 
and to commission the translation of the contract itself. The 
same might also be true of players’ intermediaries, of course, 
especially if they are also based in developing countries. 
Then again, clearly some players’ intermediaries are located 
in Europe and work with top clubs and players on negotia-
tions for very lucrative contracts. It is by no means beyond 
the financial capacity of these agents/intermediaries to pro-
vide language support to players.
The implication, therefore, is that it is the player’s repre-
sentative rather than the club who bears a primary respon-
sibility for ensuring that the player receives the translation/
interpreting services he needs. But what follows from this? 
Would it absolve the club of moral blame for taking advan-
tage of the weak position of the player in circumstances 
where the player’s representative had failed to ensure that 
adequate translation services were on hand? Would it show 
that the club has no responsibilities whatsoever to provide 
language support during contractual negotiations and sign-
ing meetings? We believe that the correct answer to both 
questions is negative.
First, the fact that the player’s agent or intermediary had a 
primary responsibility to provide the language support—and 
failed to do so—does not necessarily absolve the club of 
moral blame for having taken advantage of this weakness or 
for having exploited the player, if indeed that is what it has 
done. That the club did not actually cause the weakness—
i.e. that it did not fail to discharge a primary responsibility 
to provide language support—does not necessarily excuse 
the act of offering a substantively unconscionable contract 
(one-sided or harsh terms) or the act of violating the player’s 
autonomy (terms that do not reflect the will of the player).
Second, and this follows on from the first point, even if 
the club does not have a primary responsibility it might yet 
have a secondary responsibility to provide translation and 
interpreting services. We believe that in situations where 
players’ representatives either are unable or unwilling to pro-
vide the necessary language support, the relevant clubs have 
secondary responsibilities to provide this support, whenever 
they are capable of doing so. This might include procuring 
the services of an interpreter during contractual negotiations 
and signing meetings, as well as paying for the contract to 
be translated into the player’s first or even second language. 
In the case of standard form contracts, clubs may be able to 
pool some of these costs, of course. Indeed, once a contract 
has been translated into a given language, provided there are 
no significant changes to the contract—besides the terms of 
the salary and one or two other key variables (e.g. option 
clauses)—there may be little marginal cost in producing 
each new copy for other players.
But what if the club is also either unwilling or unable to 
provide language support? Here again secondary respon-
sibilities should track capacity and fiduciary relationships. 
And so other organisations and institutions such as national 
football associations or players’ unions or professional play-
ers’ associations might also have secondary responsibilities. 
In situations where players’ intermediaries and clubs have 
both failed to fulfil their primary and secondary responsi-
bilities, respectively, it means that these other organisations 
could bear responsibility as providers of last resort.
Nevertheless, this last point is not meant to detract from 
the fact that if clubs have the capacity to provide the nec-
essary language assistance, then they ought to do so. That 
being said, capacity is not simply about whether the club 
has the brute financial capacity of procuring language 
assistance for the player and commissioning a translation/
an interpreter—all in the required time frame to meet its 
deadlines. It is also a matter of what a club can do without 
incurring unreasonable burdens. What constitutes an unrea-
sonable burden must be open to debate. The devil is always 
in the detail. But it seems plausible to say that for a wealthy 
top-flight club spending relatively small sums of money on 
translation/interpreting services—in comparison with the 
salary and the signing on fee being paid—would not be an 
unreasonable burden, either measured by the club’s strong 
financial position or by what it potentially stands to gain 
from signing the player. Then again, in these instances play-
ers or players’ intermediaries might also be wealthy enough 
to pay for the services, so the club may not have to.
Naturally the crunch point comes at the lower end of 
the professional game, where clubs are struggling to make 
ends meet and to clear debts. If they are in a position of 
hiring several untested migrant players every year on one-
year deals, most of whom do not end up being good invest-
ments, then it might be unreasonable to expect these clubs 
to pay for translation/interpreting services, based on their 
precarious financial position and the expected limited gains 
from signing these sorts of players. Nevertheless, that poorer 
clubs lack the capacity to provide such services once again 
would not necessarily absolve them of moral blame for tak-
ing advantage of this weakness or exploiting the player (e.g. 
violating the player’s autonomy), if indeed that is what they 
have done. The morally right thing to do under such circum-
stances would be to call in other organisations and institu-
tions such as the FA or the PFA to provide the services. 
Where this is impossible or impractical, and there is no 
other option, poorer clubs might simply have to refrain from 
attempting to sign players whom they have reason to believe 
are unable to comprehend the negotiations and read the con-
tracts and are not receiving adequate translation/interpreting 
services from other parties. For wealthier clubs, by contrast, 
their responsibility would be to provide translation/interpret-
ing services should the player’s representatives fail to do so.
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6  Player representatives as unqualified 
interpreters and the ethical principles 
of interpreter codes of practice
That it appears to be common practice for the player’s repre-
sentative to play the role of an ad hoc unqualified interpreter 
in negotiations and contract signing—in the absence of a 
qualified interpreter—shows that the language industry, and 
the translation and interpreting discipline, has not yet man-
aged to educate users in the football industry of the value 
of professional interpreting. This is also the case in a whole 
host of other professional domains because interpreting is 
not viewed by society as a professional skill in the way medi-
cine or law, for example, is. Interpreting is generally associ-
ated with an innate ability to speak a language rather than 
with a qualification that requires education and training, and 
adherence to professional codes of conduct. This leads to a 
widespread misapprehension that someone who can speak 
a language can translate and interpret.52 Consequently, the 
use of unqualified ad hoc interpreters is increasingly com-
mon to meet the rising needs of multilingual societies, in the 
football industry53 as elsewhere.54
Interpreter codes of practice exist in contexts where the 
majority of professional interpreting has traditionally been 
undertaken, namely conference interpreting (simultaneous 
interpreting at, for example, the UN or NATO) and com-
munity interpreting (dialogue interpreting in healthcare and 
police settings, for example). These codes of practice gen-
erally contain the following ethical principles: professional 
competence and integrity which are standard principles for 
all professions; confidentiality; neutrality/impartiality; and 
fidelity. All of these principles have been regularly chal-
lenged and debated by a wide range of interpreting prac-
titioners and scholars, examining the gamut of contexts 
in which interpreters work.55 The most common theme in 
research into interpreter ethics is that of interpreters identi-
fying a disjunction between ethical principles espoused in 
codes of practice and the realities of professional interpret-
ers’ daily work and the expectations they are subject to, such 
disjunctions being greater in less structured events such as 
business negotiations than they are in highly regulated and 
codified settings such as in a court of law.56 Although the 
‘interpreters’ we are interested in here are not profession-
als, similar gaps between ethical principles and practice are 
evident. Individuals playing the dual role of player repre-
sentative and unqualified interpreter have no professional 
interpreting obligations to respect. Indeed, they are unlikely 
to have any knowledge of interpreter codes of conduct. Their 
clients can thus have no expectation that the person under-
taking the interpreting is providing a professional service.
Professional competence means an interpreter being com-
mitted to high standards of performance, and ensuring s/he 
has the appropriate skills and knowledge for the interpret-
ing task. The consequence of a non-professional adopting 
the interpreting role in the contexts we are exploring can 
be that his/her proficiency in English as a foreign language 
and his/her proficiency in interpreting can vary greatly. We 
also note, for example, accounts of negotiations proceed-
ing using Google translate,57 a tool that can be effective for 
simple non-technical stretches of language, but is distinctly 
limited when dealing with the complex technical language 
typically found in contracts.
We will look at integrity and neutrality/impartiality 
together. Integrity includes honesty, such as ‘avoiding or 
declaring conflicts of interest, and deriving no personal 
gain from information obtained in the exercise of the pro-
fession’.58 There is no doubt that individuals adopting the 
dual role of player representative and unqualified interpreter 
have a conflict of interest in their interpreting work and so 
their integrity as interpreters can be questioned, as indeed 
can their neutrality/impartiality. Impartiality as a profes-
sional stance to be adopted by interpreters denies inter-
preters agency and visibility and is challenged by a wide 
range of scholars who demonstrate that there are many cir-
cumstances, in many contexts, where interpreters cannot 
be impartial and/or invisible, where they need to employ 
clarifying, cultural brokering, or even advocating strategies 
to counter power imbalances.59 It is interesting to note pro-
fessional business interpreter Karansiou’s observation that 
‘in high-level business interpreting negotiations there are 
usually two interpreters representing the interests of each 
side’.60 In other words, when the stakes are high, both par-
ties ensure they have a professional linguist mediating on 
their side to counter the risk of a lack of neutrality in the 
interpreting—a risk that is to be expected.
Therefore, that there should usually only be one person 
interpreting in football contract negotiations and signing 
meetings and that s/he should be representing the player are 
surprising. The club may be saving money by not paying for 
a professional interpreter, but it potentially ends up with a 
less beneficial deal because the interlingual communication 
52 Mikkelson (1996); Rudvin (2007).
53 Lavric and Steiner (2012).
54 Schouten et  al. (2012); Pérez-González and Susam-Saraeva 
(2012).
55 Hale (2007); Inghilleri (2011); Ozolins (2014); Setton and Prunč 
(2015).
56 Ozolins (2014), p. 31; Setton and Prunč (2015), p. 147.
57 Football Agent 1; Football Agent 3.
58 Setton and Prunč (2015), p. 146.
59 Angelelli (2006); Barsky (1996); Inghilleri (2011).
60 Cited in Downie (2016), p. 11.
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is controlled by the player’s representative(s). The intense 
media interest in the football industry and the huge wages 
earned by players mean that clubs are highly protective 
against outsiders,61 and outsiders would include interpreters. 
Consider this insight from Player Liaison Officer 7, com-
menting on the use of professional interpreters in contract 
signing meetings:
When you bring in external translators (sic) there’s an 
ethos within the club, there’s a psychology within the 
club, there’s all kinds of things running within the club 
that you want to keep within the club. It’s the way we 
do it, it’s our nature. When players come in we recruit 
with that in mind so you don’t want to be giving away 
too many of your secrets outside of the club.62
In contract signing situations, in the absence of pro-
fessional codes of conduct which provide a framework of 
impersonal professional trust—namely an obligation to 
adhere to good practice, expert knowledge and competence, 
lack of personal or institutional bias, and maintenance of 
confidentiality—the club, and indeed the players, have to, 
and do, rely on personal trust and established relationships 
in order to protect their interests.63 This practice also ena-
bles clubs to protect the confidentiality of the negotiations, 
thereby addressing another of the standard principles of 
interpreter codes of practice. It is probable that in some 
contract negotiations this trust is misplaced.
Ozolins, in his review of interpreting research notes that 
the little research there is into business/commercial inter-
preting indicates an approach focussed on getting business 
done, on communicative efficiency, rather than on the kind 
of concern for accuracy of interpreting that is highly val-
ued in legal contexts, for example.64 Interestingly, work on 
the interpretation of press conferences in Formula 1 motor 
racing and at European football championships also finds 
that the rendition of the essentials is sufficient for users to 
feel that quality interpreting has been delivered.65 A focus 
on communicative efficiency can lead to interpreters going 
against codes of ethics, not least the fidelity principle they 
obey in other interpreting settings—including summarising 
or expanding text, or censoring messages to avoid conflicts 
arising which could derail negotiations66—thus providing an 
example of how the principle of neutrality could be tested in 
the interpretation context of negotiations over a professional 
footballer’s contract.
The pragmatic communicative efficiency that is in evi-
dence in how the interpreting can be conducted in business 
contexts, and indeed in sporting contexts, is reflected in the 
club’s pragmatic use of the player’s representative to under-
take any interpreting. Hiring an interpreter costs money 
and, as noted by Football Agent 1: ‘Football clubs tend not 
to spend money on things unless they have to, even at the 
highest level’.67 It is quite simply cheaper for a club to use 
the player’s representative as interpreter in contract negotia-
tions and contract signing meetings. It also makes practical 
sense for the club to allow the player’s representative to look 
after the interpreting because there will usually be an estab-
lished relationship between the player’s representative and 
the player and thus an established channel of interlingual 
communication.
In fact, there are several reasons why not using profes-
sional interpreters in contract negotiations and signing meet-
ings has become normalised or conventional practice:
• clubs might assume (rightly or wrongly) that all the inter-
preting work has already been done behind the scenes;
• lack of appreciation and value placed on professional 
interpreting skills by clubs;
• a ‘getting the job done’ pragmatism whereby available 
resources (often the intermediary/agent) are used to 
interpret, which saves using scarce resources on hiring 
professional interpreters;
• a mistrust of outsiders in general which is amplified in 
confidential contract negotiation and signing sessions;
• ignorance of the fact of the true extent of the player’s 
lack of English skills, including where a player’s silence 
is misinterpreted as comprehension plus acquiescence;
• a high turnover of managers and of recruitment staff 
might inhibit the development of a long-term policy or 
set of rules within the culture of each club;
• a principled view that it is the responsibility of the player 
and his representative(s) to provide translators/interpret-
ers;
• a vested interest in not providing translators/interpreters 
because of a perception that this makes it easier to con-
trol the player and get what the club wants.
Despite the convention of agents/intermediaries look-
ing after any translation/interpreting needs, we believe that 
partly because contract negotiations and signing meetings in 
professional football are potentially very lucrative commer-
cial events, where the stakes can be very high, clubs would 
benefit from the presence of translators/interpreters. After 
61 Football Agent 3, especially comment quoted above about people 
preying on players.
62 Player Liaison Officer 7.
63 See Edwards et al. (2006), p. 90, concerning how migrants prefer 
family members as interpreters in health consultations.
64 Ozolins (2014), p. 30.
65 Sergio (2003), p. 170; Sandrelli (2012), p. 99.
66 Takimoto (2006). 67 Football Agent 1.
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all, in order to protect themselves against being unable to 
enforce contracts against players (having the player escape 
the contract) because the contract is unconscionable, clubs 
would be well advised to check whether the player has pro-
ficient English (and either insist that the player attends the 
contract signing meeting with an interpreter hired by the 
player or if necessary provide access to an interpreter hired 
by the club, or a neutral body) or to themselves produce a 
version of the contract in the first language of the player. 
If so, then clubs could not be accused of knowingly taking 
unfair advantage of the fact that the player was unable to 
read and comprehend the language in which the contract 
was written.
We set out our recommendations more fully in the next 
section.
7  Practical recommendations
Drawing on the above, we now make a series of recommen-
dations for each of the stakeholders in professional football 
contracts. Our first recommendation is that:
• ideally there ought to be present two qualified interpret-
ers, one provided by each negotiating party.68
This stems from our understanding that it is just as pos-
sible for the club to be in the dark and for the player’s inter-
mediary/agent and the player to be manipulating the negotia-
tions in their own favour. This alone provides an economic 
reason for clubs to employ their own interpreters rather than 
rely on players’ agents/intermediaries.
Our second set of recommendations concern what agents 
and intermediaries, in particular, should do to protect their 
clients. They should:
• if they have the capacity, assess the language needs of 
their clients and provide translation/interpreting services 
during negotiations and contract signing meetings;
• join relevant intermediaries associations and sign up to 
those associations’ code of conduct;
• lobby the relevant association and the industry as a whole 
to make sure that checks are being done as to compliance 
with the code of conduct.
For their part, intermediaries associations should:
• establish a code of conduct including a clause on the 
provision of English language support, calling on inter-
mediaries to procure the services of translators/interpret-
ers during contractual negotiations and contract signing 
meetings, and to purchase translations of contracts if not 
translated by clubs, where they have this capacity.
Our third tranche of recommendations have to do with 
what clubs should do if intermediaries fail to act. We believe 
they should:
• identify whether or not the player is a native speaker of 
English;
• make robust enquiries as to whether the intermediary/
agent is providing adequate English language translation/
interpreting to the player, which will involve not taking 
the player’s silence at face value;
• if they have a reasonable suspicion that the player is not 
being adequately assisted, they should provide, where 
necessary, translation/interpreting services to the player 
during contractual negotiations and signing sessions, if 
they have the capacity;
• produce versions of the contracts in the first language 
of the player, as is practice in many European countries, 
once again if they have the capacity.
Our final group of recommendations pertain to situations 
in which neither the player’s representative(s) nor the club 
have either the inclination or the capacity to offer language 
services:
• one or both of these parties should seek the presence of 
a neutral interpreter provided by an independent body, 
such as a national football association, players’ union or 
professional players’ association, at the very least for the 
contract signing meeting.
For their part, these independent bodies should also be:
• prepared and willing to act as last resort providers of 
English language support;
• proactive in ensuring that players have access to neutral 
interpreters/translators, even in circumstances where nei-
ther intermediaries nor clubs are willing to flag up the 
issues to them or make requests on behalf of players;
• pursue the avenue of putting players who are in the pro-
cess of negotiating and signing contracts in contact with 
other players who are further along in their careers but 
who have themselves been through the same processes 
and have had the same language challenges, so that they 
can share their experiences of the pitfalls and how to 
avoid them.
Importantly, the above recommendations are not only 
about protecting the club’s interests, and about upholding 
ethical values in the applied practice of translation, but 68 See also Pym (1992), pp. 152–3.
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also about protecting the player from exploitation. Thus, 
in earlier sections we argued that because of language bar-
riers, non-English-speaking players could end up signing 
unconscionable contracts, if not based on procedural or 
substantive unfairness, then potentially based on viola-
tions of their autonomy. Whilst clubs may find themselves 
at a disadvantage in the negotiations because the player’s 
representative(s) can control all the communication across 
language barriers, the player is often also entirely dependent 
on his representative(s). We end with the words of a former 
migrant player which poignantly illustrates this last problem:
It was done in English so I remember the first one from 
Italian Serie A club to EPL club, that was done in Eng-
lish so, again, I couldn’t understand. I trusted my agent 
to make sure he gets me the right contract. Again, I 
think if I had understood the contract I could have had 
some objections about the terms and the objectives of 
the contract because I wasn’t very happy afterwards. 
An interpreter or someone in a way who could under-
stand the contract that would have greatly helped. It 
would have allowed me to make an informed decision 
and whether I think that contract is suitable for me or 
not rather than giving blind trust to an agent which I 
don’t know whether they are working for my interest or 
for the club’s interest or for his own interest.69
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